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A Tipsy Balance: Dormant Commerce Clause




Since the repeal of Prohibition, the Twenty-first Amendment has been
largely understood to allow states the power to regulate the way alcohol is
manufactured, distributed, and sold within their jurisdictions.' The
alcoholic regulatory landscape of the United States is incredibly varied.
For example two-thirds of the states have established a private license
system that allows private enterprises to purchase and sell alcoholic
beverages at each state's discretion.2 Seventeen states have adopted a state
monopoly system of regulation over the wholesale and retail of alcoholic
beverages.3 In Granholm v. Heald, the Supreme Court concluded that state
alcohol regulations discriminating against out-of-state wineries, by only
allowing them to sell to in-state distributors and not directly to the state's
consumers (i.e., a three-tier alcohol beverage distribution system), violated
the dormant Commerce Clause because the regulation did not impose the
same requirement to in-state wineries.4 Although the Court ruled that the
three-tier system was a permissible exercise of state authority under
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court also held that the
effect of compelling only out-of-state wineries to pass through the scheme
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
2. The Control Systems, NATIONAL ALCOHOL BEVERAGE AsSOCIATION (2016), http://
www.nabca.org/States/States.aspx.
3. Id.
4. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005).
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created an impermissible burden not borne by in-state wineries and,
therefore, was unconstitutional.
Post-Granholm, courts still attempt to reconcile the tension between
state power conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment and potential
limitations on those powers imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause.
Currently, Pennsylvania's Liquor Code requires out-of-state beer and malt
beverage manufacturers to contract with in-state distributors in order to sell
their products to Pennsylvania residents.6  Conversely, in-state
manufacturers can sell directly to residents.7 This advantage essentially
creates the same unequal application of the three-tier alcoholic beverage
regulatory scheme that was held unconstitutional in Granholm.
This note will examine: (1) the United States' history of federal
regulation of alcohol; (2) the progression of Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence and its interplay with potential limits of states' alcohol
regulating powers by the dormant Commerce Clause; (3) the procedural
history and legal landscape leading up to Granholm; (4) the Supreme
Court's affirmation of Commerce Clause limits on the Twenty-first
Amendment in Granholm; (5) the state of dormant Commerce Clause
limits post-Granholm; (6) how the Granholm analysis supports the
argument that Pennsylvania's regulation forcing out-of-state beer and malt
beverage manufacturers to abide by the three-tier system is similarly
burdensome, discriminatory, and in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause; and (7) how three particular justifications for the state's absolute
regulatory power under the Twenty-first Amendment are outdated in light
of the shift in case law and the growth of e-commerce in the alcohol
industry.
I. The United States' History of Federal Regulation of Alcohol
The Anti-Saloon League of America ("ASLA") led a movement of
prohibitionism in the United States, which gained momentum after a
decades-long campaign.8  The temperance movement sought to reduce
sales of alcoholic beverages across the country.9 ALSA successfully
mobilized Protestant business owners and churches to vote for and support
candidates who would enforce prohibitionist legislation.'0  Congress
5. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
6. 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-444 (2016).
7. Id.
8. Harry G. Levine, The Birth ofAmerican Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite,
and the Problem ofLawlessness, 12 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 63, 66 (1985).
9. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476.
10. Levine, supra note 8, at 66.
[Vol. 44:2204 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Winter 2017] DCC LIMITS ON THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
ratified the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, which prohibited "the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors" within the
United States." The accompanying legislation, the National Prohibition
Act (also known as the Volstead Act), granted federal and state
governments the power to enforce the ban that went into effect later that
year.12
II. Evolution of Alcohol Regulations from the Dormant
Commerce Clause to the Twenty-first Amendment
A. Commerce Clause
Article 1 of the Constitution vests in Congress the authority to
"regulate Commerce . . . among the several States."'3 This authority "has
long been understood to have a 'negative' [or 'dormant'] aspect that denies
the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the
interstate flow of articles of commerce."1 4  The Court defined
"discrimination" as the "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interest that benefits the former and burdens the latter." 's When
state laws are challenged under the Commerce Clause, facially
discriminatory laws motivated by "simple economic protectionism" are
subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" and invoke the strictest
scrutiny.'6  If a statute is not facially discriminatory, the state bears the
burden of demonstrating that the law "advances a legitimate local purpose"
and that such purpose "cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives."' In instances where state laws have
legitimate purposes that will only incidentally affect interstate commerce,
the Court adopts a slightly more deferential approach.'8  The party
challenging the validity of the statute bears the burden of proof to show that
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
12. National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305, repealed by
Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, Pub. L. No. 74-347, 49 Stat. 872 (1935);
Levine, supra note 8, at 66.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
15. Id. at 99.
16. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) ("At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the
strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.").
17. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
18. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
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the law discriminates or places a burden on interstate commerce.19 Any
law that discriminates against interstate commerce will be evaluated using
a balancing test that weighs whether the burden imposed by the law
outweighs the local benefits.20 If the burden is excessive in relation to the
local benefits, the law will be found unconstitutional.2 ' If the burden is
minimal and the law promotes a substantial state interest, the law will
likely survive the Court's scrutiny.22
The first dormant Commerce Clause challenge to state regulatory
powers of alcohol distribution came in Thurlow v. Massachusetts.23 The
Court rejected the notion that the dormant Commerce Clause limited the
state's broad authority over the sale of alcohol24 even when states began
* 25
banning liquor within their territories. It was not until 1888 in Bowman v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. that the Court was presented with a
statute that unquestionably regulated interstate commerce.26 The contested
Iowa statute once again raised the question of whether the dormant
Commerce Clause overruled the state's authority to regulate the
importation of alcohol.27 The state argued that it had a legitimate purpose
to prevent the alcohol from entering its borders-to protect the welfare and
morals of its citizens.2 8 The Court struck down the statute, ruling that a
state's right to regulate the sale of liquor did not give it free reign to violate
the dormant Commerce Clause.29 Rather, its authority only came into
effect once it passed through the state's borders.30
Prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, the Court
continued to invalidate other state liquor regulations primarily on two
grounds: (1) the Commerce Clause prevented states from discriminating
against imported liquor, and (2) states could not pass facially neutral laws
that, in its practical effect, placed an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.31 After Bowman, Iowa adopted a statute banning the sale of all
19. Id. at 624.
20. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
21. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
22. Id.
23. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 586 (1847).
24. Id.
25. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).
26. Bowman v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 474 (1888).
27. Id. at 479.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 500.
30. Id.
31. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 101 (1897); see Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125
(1889).
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liquor, regardless of where it was produced or imported.32 The Court held
that as long as the imported liquor remained unopened in its original
packaging it was considered an article of interstate commerce and outside
of the state's regulatory reach. The state could not prohibit the
importation or sale of out-of-state alcohol.34 This decision was contrary to
established precedent,35 where the Court now created a situation where in-
state producers would be put at a competitive disadvantage because the
state could burden them with more stringent regulations while out-of-state
producers could not be regulated.36
B. The Wilson Act Confines States' Authority to Their Borders
Congress passed the Wilson Act ("Wilson") in 1890, allowing states
to regulate the sale of liquor "upon arrival" in the state "to the same extent
and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been
produced" within the state.37  On one hand, Wilson permitted states to
regulate alcohol consumption and distribution within their borders as they
wished, yet it required out-of-state liquor to be regulated in the same
manner as in-state liquor.38 However, its language was problematic-an
individual may act lawfully in a "wet" state, as they are allowed to sell
alcohol, while simultaneously violating laws imposed by a "dry" state.39
One year later, the Court reaffirmed Wilson's constitutionality in In re
Rahrer.40 Upon Wilson's passage, Iowa reinstated the same statute the
Court struck down in Bowman.4 1 The Court once again invalidated the
statute and, with a more restrictive interpretation, ruled that the regulations
would be imposed at the point of delivery to the consumer and at the point
of resale.4 2 This meant that states had the power to control the resale of
imported alcohol once it entered the state but not to ban the importation of
alcohol outright, thus protecting the out-of-state shipper from incurring any
32. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 124-25.
33. Id. at 124.
34. Id. at 125.
35. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).
36. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000).
37. Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. §121 (2012)).
38. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1898).
39. Id. For the purpose of this Note, "wet" state is defined as a state that allows the sale and
importation of alcohol, while a "dry" state is defined as a state that prohibits it.
40. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891).
41. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 417-18.
42. Id. at 412.
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penalties.4 3 As a result, the direct delivery liquor trade flourished as out-of-
state manufacturers circumvented state regulation because they were
44
allowed to send liquor directly to consumers.
C. Webb-Kenyon Act Expands Wilson Act Powers
In 1913, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act ("Webb-Kenyon") in
an attempt to reshift the power to the states.45 The new legislation was
designed to "extend that which was done by the Wilson Act"46 and "close
the direct-shipment gap."4 7  Webb-Kenyon clarified that states had the
power to prevent the importation of alcohol into any state in violation of
those state's laws.4 8 When the bill was first brought for approval, President
William Taft vetoed it, arguing that it was an impermissible delegation of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers.4 9  Despite his attempt, Congress
overrode the veto.50 Even with the constitutionality of Webb-Kenyon in
question, the Court did not uphold the law until it was challenged in James
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co.5 1
D. Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment
The political climate in the United States by the late 1920s markedly
changed and there was a growing concern regarding the unenforceability of
Prohibition on a national scale. The devastating consequences of the Great
Depression undermined two crucial prohibitionist principles: (1) that
Prohibition would bring about American prosperity, and (2) that
Prohibition would bring order to the growing lawlessness in society.
5 2
Legislators struggled to maintain Prohibition as public support was
waning. A commission headed by George Wickersham, the U.S. Attorney
General under President William Taft, presented a two-page summary of
conclusions signed by ten of the eleven commissioners who opposed the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.53 President Hoover released the full
43. Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1898).
44. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 426.
45. 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2016).
46. James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324 (1917).
47. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 481 (2005).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 279 (1919).
51. James Clark Distilling Co., 242 U.S. at 325 (holding that the Dormant Commerce
Clause did not provide immunity to alcohol distributors who violated state laws).
52. Levine, supra note 8, at 72
53. Id. at 74-75.
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report ("Wickersham Report") on January 20, 193 1.54 Although most of
the commissioners opposed legalizing alcohol, the Wickersham Report
"found widespread disobedience to Prohibition" and suggested that
"prohibition could never be enforced" nationally.5 5 The newspapers noted
the contradictions between the facts in the report and the summary signed
by President Hoover.56 The media's negative treatment of the report
echoed the shift in public sentiment against Prohibition and paved the way
for its repeal.
Thirteen years later, Congress voted to submit the Twenty-first
Amendment for ratification to the state conventions and the House
approved it on February 20, 1934, thereby repealing the Eighteenth
Amendment.58 Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment prohibits the
"transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof . . . ."59 The question then became whether Section 2
gave states absolute control over the importation of alcohol even if states'
laws discriminated against interstate commerce. Initial testimony in
congressional debates from Senator John J. Blaine, who spearheaded the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, indicated that Congress intended to
clarify the purpose of Section 2-to restore power to the states absolute
control over alcohol traffic via constitutional amendment.60 In other words,
under the Twenty-first Amendment states could choose to remain "dry."
III. Conflicting Interpretations of Twenty-first Amendment
Powers and Limits
Supreme Court jurisprudence post-passage of the Twenty-first
Amendment favored a fairly permissive interpretation of states' right to
regulate even if states' laws implicated the dormant Commerce Clause.6 1
In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., the Court upheld a
California regulation mandating a five hundred dollar license fee on out-of-
54. Id. at 74.
55. Id. at 75.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 74-75.
58. Levine, supra note 8, at 81.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
60. Ethan Davis, Uncorking a Seventy-Four-Year-Old Bottle: A Toast to the Free Flow of
Liquor Across State Borders, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 133, 137 (2007).
61. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939); see
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936).
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state beer importers.6 2 Justice Brandeis unequivocally affirmed the Court's
position that Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment "confer[red] upon
the State the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the
conditions which it prescribes."63 In cases following Young's Market Co.,
the Court upheld the states' broad regulatory powers and solidified their
authority to place more burdensome trade barriers.64
A. Application of Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations
Almost three decades later, despite the precedent set by Young's
Market Co. and its progeny, the Court softened its stance against enforcing
dormant Commerce Clause limits with its decision in Hostetter v. Idelwild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. The Court held that if it were to accept the
premise that states' powers under Section 2 were absolute, regardless of
whether they infringed upon the Commerce Clause, Congress would have
no regulatory power over interstate commerce in regard to liquor.65 The
dissent argued that the exclusion of a proposed section that would have
provided Congress with the "concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors" 66 illustrated congressional intent to carve out
67
language to confer absolute plenary powers to the states. But "such a
conclusion," Justice Stewart firmly stated, "would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."68 The Court further noted that "[b]oth the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same
Constitution" and each section "must be considered in the light of the
other" within the context of each specific case.69
Taking it a step further, the Court in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
"foreclose[d] any contention that [Section] 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment immunize[d] discriminatory direct-shipment laws from
Commerce Clause scrutiny."70 In Bacchus, the state of Hawaii had enacted
regulations that mandated a twenty percent excise tax on liquor.7 1
Alcoholic beverages produced locally in Hawaii were exempted from
62. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at 64.
63. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at 62.
64. See Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 391; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132,
141 (1939).
65. Hostetter v. Idelwild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964).
66. Id. at 337 (Black, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 332.
69. Id.
70. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487-88 (2005).
71. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1984).
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taxation.72 State legislators found it was in the state's interest to use the tax
revenues to "defray the costs of police and other governmental services that
the Hawaii Legislature concluded had been increased due to the
consumption of liquor." 7 3 Out-of-state liquor wholesalers sued, arguing
that the tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it was
discriminatory in its purpose and effect, favoring in-state businesses.74 The
Court held that the tax exemptions discriminated against interstate
commerce by giving the local Hawaiian liquor industry a commercial
advantage. In effect, the tax placed significant economic barriers to
competition.76 The Court relied on its analysis in Hostetter, reaffirming
that the Twenty-first Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation
of alcoholic beverages from the Commerce Clause's reach. The decision
created a balancing test weighing the federal interests against the state
interests under the Twenty-first Amendment.7 8
Justice Stevens criticized the Court in his dissent for ignoring the
precedent set in Young's Market Co. 7 9 He opined that the Twenty-first
Amendment foreclosed the wholesalers' Commerce Clause claim and that
the Court had previously upheld legislation that imposed similar taxes.80
Even if a statute is not discriminatory on its face, it may be
discriminatory in its effect.8' In such cases, states have an opportunity to
save such statutes from invalidation by proving that the law "serves
legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available
nondiscriminatory alternatives."82 For example, in Maine v. Taylor, the
Court upheld a discriminatory provision banning importation of baitfish
because the state was able to show that the imported baitfish introduced
parasites into the existing baitfish population that otherwise did not exist in
the state.83 The state successfully demonstrated that alternatives to the ban
were unavailable.8 4
72. Id. at 265.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 266.
75. Id. at 276.
76. Id.
77. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1984).
78. Id. at 270.
79. Id. at 284, 286.
80. Id. at 285-86.
81. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
82. Id. at 151.
83. Id. at 148-49.
84. Id. at 151.
In subsequent decisions following Maine, the Court made clear that
the nondiscrimination principle of the dormant Commerce Clause serves
economic interests that would otherwise be unprotected.8 When the state
of New York began requiring that a liquor producer file a monthly schedule
of prices and attach an affirmation that it would not sell its liquor for lower
than the scheduled prices in any other state, the Court held the statute
violated the Commerce Clause because it effectively controlled the liquor
prices in other states.86  Such control was not a permissible exercise of
States' power under the Twenty-first Amendment even if the statute was
not discriminatory in the sense that both in-state and out-of-state liquor
producers would have to abide by the affirmation provision.8 7 In a later
case, the Court emphasized that the Twenty-first Amendment did not
"immunize state laws from invalidation under the Commerce Clause when
those laws have the practical effect of regulating sales in other States."88
IV. Granholm v. Heald: The Twenty-first Amendment Does Not
Permit Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
A. Introduction to the Three-Tier System and Prohibition of Direct
Shipment
Today, twenty-six states are "closed" states that prohibit most
interstate direct shipments.8 9 While out-of-state direct shipping violations
are misdemeanors in most states, seven states have elevated them to
felonies.90
The current three-tier system of regulating the distribution of alcohol
was developed after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment.
91
Under this system, a manufacturer must obtain a permit from the Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau ("ATF"), which allows them to import
alcohol within the United States.92 The manufacturer then sells its product
85. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (stating that statutes that "only incidentally" burden
interstate commerce face less demanding scrutiny).
86. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 576 (1986)
(The affirmation stated, "no higher than the lowest price at which such item of liquor will be sold
by such [distiller] to any wholesaler anywhere in any other state of the United States.").
87. Id. at 585.
88. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 342 (1989) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., 476 U.S. at 585).
89. FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE:
WINE 2 (July 2003) [hereinafter FTC Report], http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id. at 5.
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to a wholesaler licensed with the state, which pays excise taxes and delivers
the product to retailers.93 Retailers then sell to consumers and collect sales
taxes.94 By requiring manufacturers to sell through wholesalers, "states
hoped to collect taxes more efficiently and to limit alcohol sales to
minors."95
B. Granholm v. Heald - the Dormant Commerce Clause Prevails
In Granholm, the Court consolidated two different cases, Heald v.
Engler and Swedenburg v. Kelly, to definitively decide the split over the
dormant Commerce Clause issue in these three-tier regulatory schemes.9 6
Heald v. Engler challenged a Michigan statute that permitted in-state
wineries to directly ship to Michigan consumers subject to a licensing
requirement but prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing the same,
regardless of whether they were licensed.9 7 Instead, out-of-state wineries
were required to pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer before
their products could reach Michigan consumers.98 The Sixth Circuit
invalidated the law because it violated the dormant Commerce Clause.99
The New York statute at issue in Swedenburg only differed from the
Michigan statute in that it did not ban direct shipments altogether; it
required out-of-state wineries to establish presence within the state in order
to sell to the state's consumers.00 The Second Circuit based its decision on
the principle that insofar as Section 2 permitted each state to regulate
alcohol traffic within its borders, it "primarily created an exception to the
normal operation of the Commerce Clause."'0' The court ruled that the
state's prohibition of the sale and shipment of wine by unlicensed wineries
directly to New York consumers served valid regulatory interests and was
not overly burdensome.102 Under this scheme, out-of-state wineries were
required to establish distributing operations in the state in order to directly
ship to consumers.'03 Essentially, out-of-state wineries would have to incur
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FTC Report, supra note 89, at 6.
96. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465 (2005) (Granholm consolidated Heald v. Engler,
342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003) and Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).).
97. Engler, 342 F.3d at 519.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 527.
100. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474.
101. Swendenburg, 358 F.3d at 236 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)).
102. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2004).
103. Id.
213
costs in establishing and maintaining a physical presence in New York, but
those same costs were not incurred by in-state wineries.1 0 4 The court held
that these effects, however, did not alter the legitimacy of the delegation of
authority under Section 2 because the statutory scheme only regulated
alcohol within the state.05 Thus, the court did not find that the regulatory
scheme was intended to favor local interests over out-of-state interests.
106
Both in-state and out-of-state wineries were permitted to obtain a license as
long as the winery established a physical presence in the state.'
07 The court
justified its decision, noting "business efficiency must give way to valid
regulatory concerns in this unique area of commerce."08
This split between the Second and Sixth Circuit highlighted the
ongoing tension between state courts and the Supreme Court over whether
these alcoholic regulatory schemes solely fell within the ambit of Section 2
of the Twenty-first Amendment.109 After decades of conflicting precedent,
the Court in Granholm concluded that the dormant Commerce Clause
could limit Twenty-first Amendment powers when it upheld the Sixth
Circuit's decision to invalidate Michigan's law and reverse the Second
Circuit's decision that upheld the New York statutory scheme."
0 The
Court noted it had previously ruled in other Section 2 cases that: (1) state
laws that violated other provisions of the Constitution were not saved by
the Twenty-first Amendment; (2) Section 2 did not nullify Congress's
Commerce Clause powers with regard to alcohol; and (3) state regulation
of alcohol was limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce
Clause."' In a five to four opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority, mandating out-of-state wineries while exempting in-state
wineries constituted explicit discrimination against interstate commerce.
The Court determined that the policy was motivated by economic
protectionism and such "[d]iscrimination is contrary to the Commerce
Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment."I12 Furthermore,
Section 2 "does not allow States to regulate the direct shipment of wine on
terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers."' 3
104. Swendenburg, 358 F.3d at 237.
105. Id. at 237-38.
106. Id. at 237.
107. Id.
108. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2004).
109. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 471 (2005).
110. Id. at 493.
111. Id. at 483.
112. Id. at 489.
113. Id. at 476.
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The Court applied a traditional Commerce Clause analysis in
Granholm.14 As with any other facially discriminatory laws, the Court
noted that state laws may be saved from invalidation if the state can show
that it "advance[d] a legitimate local purpose that [could not] be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.""5  The state's two
primary justifications for strictly regulating out-of-state wineries were to
keep alcohol out of the hands of minors and ensure a more effective mode
of tax collection.1 16 The Court rejected both arguments, observing that the
states provided "little concrete evidence for the sweeping assertion" that
they could not effectively collect taxes on direct shipments by out-of-state
wineries. 17
Justices Kennedy and Stevens disagreed on whether alcohol should be
regulated as a separate and distinct commodity under the Twenty-first
Amendment. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that alcohol was not
"an ordinary article of commerce.""8  Justice Thomas' contextually
focused dissent admonished the majority for overlooking the language in
Webb-Kenyon, which he argued "displace[d] any negative Commerce
Clause barrier to state regulation of liquor sales to in-state consumers." 19
V. Post-Granholm Dormant Commerce Clause Limits Are Here
to Stay
The focus of litigation in this regulatory space after the Granholm
decision shifted away from manufacturers and towards retailers who are
part of the last tier in the system. Once again, Michigan became a
battleground for this issue in Siesta Village Market, LLC. v. Granholm.120
The state's laws prohibited out-of-state retailers from shipping directly to
consumers unless they maintained a physical location in Michigan and
became part of the three-tier system.121 Retailers claimed that the statute
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.12 2  The state argued that the
current system of distribution allowed it discretion to inspect wholesalers-
114. Id.
115. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 492.
118. Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 497-98 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).





to ensure that the wine complied with state laws-and repeated the similar
argument that the state had a legitimate interest in ensuring that retailers
were not selling alcohol to minors.'23 The district court held that the state
did not meet its burden of showing that less restrictive nondiscriminatory
alternatives to a ban out-of-state wine shipments from retailers were
unfeasible.124 Because out-of-state retailers' only way to have direct access
to Michigan consumers was to open a location in the state, this created an
extra burden.125
A similar challenge arose in Illinois, when out-of-state brewers
claimed the Illinois Liquor Control Act of 1934 violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because it favored in-state brewers more than out-of-
state brewers.12 6 The district court held that Illinois could not permit in-
state brewers to act as their own distributors while precluding out-of-state
brewers from that same privilege.12 7 The state could not demonstrate a
need for such discrimination and, therefore, Illinois's system violated the
dormant Commerce Clause because it prevented out-of-state brewers from
competing on equal terms.'
2 8
In cases where there was equitable treatment of in-state and out-of-
state retailers, the courts have upheld the statute's constitutionality.'
29 In
Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, retailers brought a claim against the state,
arguing that sections 100(1), 102(l)(a), and 102(1)(b) of New York's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law were unconstitutional because they
prohibited out-of-state wine retailers from directly selling to in-state
consumers.13 0 The statutes required that all liquor sold, delivered, shipped,
or transported to a New York consumer first pass through a licensed entity
in the state.131 Both in-state and out-of-state products passed through the
same three-tier system before reaching the consumer.'
3 2 On appeal, the
Second Circuit held that the statutes were a valid exercise of the state's
rights under the Twenty-first Amendment because the system treated in-
state and out-of-state retailers equitably and did not discriminate against
123. Siesta Village, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
124. Id. at 1044.
125. Id. at 1039.
126. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schnorf, 738 F. Supp. 2d 793, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
127. Id. at 817.
128. Id.
129. Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2009).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 191.
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out-of-state products or manufacturers.'33 Because the regulatory scheme
evenhandedly regulated the importation and distribution of alcohol within
the state, the statute did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.'34
VI. Pennsylvania's Current Regulatory Regime for Beer and
Malt Beverages Is Unconstitutional
Section 1-101 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code ("PLC") establishes
the Commonwealth's three-tier system of licensing and distribution of
alcoholic beverages.'3 5 Section 4-444 of the PLC regulates the importation
and sale of malt or brewed beverages from out-of-state manufacturers.'3 6
Out-of-state manufacturers are prohibited from selling directly to
consumers and instead must first sell their products to in-state
distributors.3 7 The distributors then sell the product to retailers, whom in
turn sell the products to Commonwealth consumers.'38 The purpose of this
system is
[T]o avoid the overly aggressive marketing and sales
practices of the pre-Prohibition era, to generate tax
revenues that can be efficiently collected from the beer
distribution industry, to facilitate state and local control of
alcoholic beverages, and to encourage moderate
consumption. 1
Accordingly, businesses involved in each tier of the system are
required to obtain a license through the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
("PLCB"). 140
However, this is not the case for manufacturers licensed in-state, who
are granted privileges that are not available to manufacturers operating
outside of Pennsylvania.141 A licensed in-state manufacturer is permitted to
not only sell malt or brewed beverages to consumers at its licensed facility,
133. Id.
134. Id. at 192.
135. 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-101-8-803 (2016).
136. Id. § 4-444.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET AND FINANCE COMMITTEE, STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT





but also is allowed to designate itself as a distributor for its products within
the state, essentially permitting direct delivery and sales to the state's
consumers and licensed retailers.142 In contrast, an out-of-state
manufacturer is required to sell its product to an importing distributor with
designated geographic territories for any distribution within
Pennsylvania.14 3 These distributors "may only purchase, receive, resell, or
deliver malt or brewed beverages in strict compliance with the distributor's
territorial franchise agreements."l44 This restriction means that retailers
may only purchase beer produced out-of-state from distributors whom are
145
licensed to sell products in a limited geographic area.
The PLC previously restricted the shipment of wine from out-of-state
wineries.146 After the Granholm ruling, the PLCB issued an "advisory,"
putting the state on notice that in-state wineries could no longer sell or ship
wine directly to consumers.147  This ban on direct shipments was
challenged in Cutner v. Newman.148 In Cutner, the district court found the
Pennsylvania statutory scheme, regulating out-of-state wineries,
unconstitutional under Granholm. The court also found the "present
restrictions against out-of-state wineries cannot constitutionally be
enforced" but clarified that the order only applied to wine and did not affect
the validity of statutes regulating other types of alcoholic beverages.14 9
In the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee Report ("LBFC
Report") examining the Commonwealth's regulatory landscape post-
Granholm, the LBFC noted that while Granholm and Cutner specifically
addressed the disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-state wineries,
similar statutes regulating malt and brewed beverages have yet to be
challenged.15 0 At a legislative committee meeting, the PLCB Deputy Chief
Counsel testified that "it would be safe to assume that a similar analysis
would be used by the courts if they were asked to review the manner in
which malt and brewed beverages are sold and distributed" in
Pennsylvania.s15  The state all but admitted that changes should be made to
bring the state into compliance with the Granholm decision. The LBFC
142. LBFC Report, supra 139, at 6.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 8.
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id.
148. Cutner v. Newman, 398 F. Supp. 2d 389 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
149. Id. at 391.
150. LBFC Report, supra note 139, at 10.
151. Id.
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Report recommended amending the PLC to allow all manufacturers to self-
distribute, thereby eliminating the disparate treatment of in-state and out-
of-state manufacturers.'52
A. The Same Dormant Commerce Clause Limits Apply to Beer and
Malt Beverages
The LBFC Report highlighted a vulnerable area of regulation that has
yet to be contested in court. Pennsylvania legislators have done little to
address the dormant Commerce Clause issue as it pertains to beer and malt
beverage since Granholm's passage. Only one bill has been introduced in
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.'5 3 That bill was subsequently
tabled indefinitely.15 4 With a reputation of being one of the strictest control
states in the nation, Pennsylvania is unlikely to change unless the judiciary
forces it to do so. In the past decade, efforts to privatize the state liquor
industry in Pennsylvania have been met with stiff opposition.'"' Just
recently, the state's Governor, Tom Wolf, vetoed House Bill 466, a piece
of legislation that would have amended the PLC to phase out state run wine
and liquor stores and allow private beer, wine, and liquor distributors to sell
alcohol with a license.156
Despite states' reluctance, it is clear that the courts are firmly asserting
dormant Commerce Clause limitations on this particular issue. The first
step in the two-tiered Commerce Clause analysis announced by the Court
in Brown-Forman is determining whether the contested statute is facially
discriminatory. 15 If a state law "directly regulates or discriminates against
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic
interests," it will generally be struck down "without further inquiry." 5 8
The Granholm Court clearly stated that "discrimination is neither
authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment"'59 and that
"state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of
152. LBFC Report, supra note 139, at 11.
153. H.R. 291, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010) (a proposed bill requiring all brewers to
utilize the three-tier system), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill history.cfm
?syear-2009&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=29 1.
154. Id.
155. Andrew Staub, Liquor Privatization Faces Uncertain Future After Passing House,
PENNSYLVANIA WATCHDOG (Mar. 2, 2015), http://watchdog.org/217578/paindy-liquor-privatiz
ation-faces-uncertain-future-after-passing-house/.
156. Id.
157. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79
(1986).
158. Id. at 579.
159. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
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the Commerce Clause." 6 0  Further inquiry into whether the regulation
unduly burdens interstate commerce is not required because such a law is
subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."' 6 1
Similarly, the regulatory regime as codified in section 4-444 of the
PLC is identical to the wine distribution scheme at issue in Granholm and
is facially discriminatory towards out-of-state beer and malt beverage
manufacturers. As noted above, the Pennsylvania statute does not mandate
in-state manufacturers of malt and brewed beverages to distribute their
product through an importing distributor, yet it requires out-of-state
manufacturers to do so.'6 2  Such disparate treatment may give in-state
manufacturers a competitive advantage, as they may distribute directly to
retailers without bearing the financial costs associated with entering into
contractual relationships with separate distributors.'
6 3 Because the statute
is discriminatory on its face and in its practical effects, the statute should be
invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Even if section 4-444 of the PLC survives the "virtually per se rule of
invalidity," a statute that has a discriminatory effect may be permitted if it
serves a legitimate state purpose that cannot be achieved by less restrictive
and nondiscriminatory means.'64  However, assuming Pennsylvania
advances the same Twenty-first Amendment justifications as the previous
cases have (e.g., temperance and effective tax collection), a court would
likely hold the statute unconstitutional because the state could operate non-
discriminately by requiring in-state manufacturers to abide by the same
regulatory scheme instead of creating significant economic barriers on
market access to out-of-state manufacturers. The focus of the analysis is
not on the constitutionality of the state's regulatory system itself, but rather
how that system constitutionally operates-that is, how these disparate
requirements can have discriminatory effects on commerce. The Court in
Granholm emphasized that the three-tier system itself is constitutionally
permitted. 165 In fact, a state may be allowed to regulate and control
interstate alcohol commerce by requiring out-of-state producers to adhere
to the system so long as the restrictions are equally applied within the
state.166  Thus, just as the Court in Granholm found that Michigan's
regulatory regime granted benefits to in-state wineries at the expense of
160. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 487.
161. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.
162. 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-444 (2016).
163. LBFC Report, supra note 139, at 10.
164. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
165. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005).
166. Id.
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out-of-state wineries, it should find Pennsylvania's beer and malt beverage
scheme equally invalid.
Moreover, using the canons of statutory interpretation in order to
harmonize conflicting interpretations of Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Court can look to the statute's legislative history and
context (or lack thereof). As Justice Stevens suggested in his dissent in
Granholm, if Congress truly had intended for alcohol to be a special
category of commodities to remain outside the reach of the Commerce
Clause, then it would have said so explicitly. This is particularly because
Congress had many opportunities to do so through legislation both before
and after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment.167  Justice
Kennedy's opinion followed the exhaustive legislative history of the
Twenty-first Amendment, noting that the language in Section 2 closely
aligned with both Wilson and Webb-Kenyon.'6 8 Webb-Kenyon "expresses
no clear congressional intent to depart from the principle ... that discrimination
against out-of-state goods is disfavored."'69 Webb-Kenyon did not propose
to repeal Wilson, which contains express language about
nondiscrimination.e70  The Court was very clear in Clark Distilling that
Webb-Kenyon was meant to be an extension of Wilson.'7' If Congress
truly intended to authorize states to discriminate against out-of-state goods
by passing Webb-Kenyon, then it could have explicitly repealed Wilson.17 2
Although an argument can be made that the Twenty-first Amendment
may supersede the Commerce Clause on grounds that the latest enacted
provision will prevail, courts must read allegedly conflicting "statutes to
give effect to each if [it] can do so while preserving their sense and
purpose." 7 3 Courts will apply the most recent rule only "if the later act
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute." 7 4 Following Justice Stewart's analysis in Hostetter, courts and
state legislatures should not read Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
separately from the Commerce Clause, but rather they should read them in
light of one another.175 Both provisions can be reconciled because states
still hold the power to regulate alcohol within the confines of their borders.
167. Id. at 496-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 484.
169. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 482.
170. Id. at 483.
171. James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 323-24 (1917).
172. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 483 (2005).
173. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981).
174. Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank ofN.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
175. Hostetter v. Idelwild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964).
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A state could impose a licensing system aimed at regulating out-of-state
distribution, as long as it equally regulates both in-state and out-of-state
distribution.
VII. Twenty-first Amendment Justifications Are Outdated and
Arguments for Deregulation
A. Temperance and the State's Interest in Preventing the Sale of
Alcohol to Minors
States have argued that allowing direct shipment or sale of alcohol
would increase the incidence of underage drinking because beer is more
accessible than wine.17 6 Although this may be a valid interest, the courts
have noted that there are ways to serve such interests without violating the
dormant Commerce Clause.177 Less restrictive requirements, such as an
adult signature and identification checks for acceptance of delivery, can
help keep alcohol out of the hands of minors and still allow brewers to
efficiently deliver products to adult consumers.
B. Economic Protectionism and the Three-Tier System Hinders Growth
of the Beer Industry
Pennsylvania's reluctance to push through legislation that would
conform its current regulations to Granholm is likely motivated by
economic protectionism. The craft brewing industry in Pennsylvania is
booming and has added as much as two billion dollars into the state's
economy.179 But such regulations substantially limit direct out-of-state sale
of wine to consumers.80 "According to the Federal Trade Commission
('FTC'), '[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single
largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce . . . .'"'1' Laws similar
to the type at issue in Granholm deny citizens equal access to other states'
markets.182 As a result, these regulations may unintentionally create trade
rivalries amongst states in favor of exclusive alliances within the state-a
consequence that the Commerce Clause was designed to avoid.1
83
Interestingly, the Granholm Court did not split along its typical ideological
176. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489-90.
177. Id. at 483-84.
178. FTC Report, supra note 89, at 26-29.
179. LBFC Report, supra note 139, at 17.
180. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 467 (2005).
181. Id. at 468.
182. Id. at 473.
183. Id.
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lines. Justice Stevens dissented, while Justices Kennedy and Scalia broke
from their conservative counterparts and joined the liberal majority.18 4
Still, Justice Scalia did not take the opportunity to affirm plenary state
power over alcohol importation, perhaps instead acknowledging that free
and less regulated commerce would be more beneficial to states'
economies as the popularity of e-commerce continues to grow.
Instead of clinging to exclusivity, Pennsylvania would be better served
eliminating the three-tier system for all brewers and producers.
Eliminating the cost of contracting with third parties at each tier would be
more beneficial for small craft brewers who often cannot compete with
larger manufacturers due to exorbitant overhead costs.'85 This shift would
promote more economic competition, which would likely drive down costs
for consumers, while still bringing in tax revenue for the state as increased
sales could mean increased revenue.
C. Effective Tax Collection on Alcohol Sales
Efficient and effective tax collection is often lauded as one of the most
important reasons for strict alcohol regulation.'86 Nonetheless, taxation on
its own may not be a sufficient justification for keeping the three-tier
system or enacting the type of restrictive statutes currently in place in
Pennsylvania. The Court's decisions in Bacchus and Granholm articulated
that these justifications do not outweigh a discriminatory ban against
interstate importation of wine.'87  The potential for tax evasion exists
whether direct shipping occurs within the state or out of the state.88
Michigan employed a tax scheme that required sellers of wine to obtain a
license to sell within the state and submit a wine tax report each month,
detailing all wine sold or imported into the state during that time period.18 9
In fact, other states have employed similar licensing and self-reporting
schemes and have had no reported problems with tax collection.'90 In
Pennsylvania, the malt beverage tax is borne by Pennsylvania
184. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 464.
185. David Scott, Don't Forget the Beer Pennsylvania Must Reform its Beer: Distribution
Laws to Comply with the Supreme Court's Landmark Decision in Granholm v. Heald,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (May 28, 2013), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/David%20
Scott-%20Don't%20Forget%20the%2OBeer.pdf.
186. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 527 (6th Cir. 2003); see Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d
223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004).
187. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005).
188. Id. at 491.
189. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491.
190. FTC Report, supra note 89, at 38-40.
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consumers.191 The tax is levied on all malt or brewed beverages sold in
Pennsylvania regardless of whether it was produced inside or outside of the
state.192  In addition, Pennsylvania also collects licensing fees for the
privilege of selling malt or brewed beverages in the state.19 3 If, under the
three-tier system, these licensing and self-reporting safeguards were
adequate enough to combat tax evasion, it would be hard to argue that they
would not have the same effect if states permitted direct shipment.194
States have a valid concern about potential noncompliance with state
regulations. Yet, there are federal remedies that could fill in the regulatory
gap and incentivize manufacturers to comply. The ATF issued a ruling
stating that compliance with the Twenty-first Amendment was a condition
for maintaining a federal alcohol permit under the Federal Administration
Act ("FAA"), and a violation of the FAA could result in revocation or
suspension of a federal permit. 95
Conclusion
America's rich and controversial history with alcohol has shaped part
of this country's legislative core. The struggle between the federal and
state government to assert their plenary powers over commerce and alcohol
led to two constitutional amendments and a tumultuous back and forth
between Supreme Court precedence lasting decades. The Supreme Court's
decision in Granholm firmly placed dormant Commerce Clause limits on a
state's Twenty-first Amendment powers to regulate alcohol when a state's
statute is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce.
In a post-Granholm regulatory landscape, Pennsylvania's current
distribution system is unconstitutional given that its statute places an
impermissible burden on out-of-state beer and malt beverage manufacturers
in favor of in-state manufacturers. Regardless of geographic location,
allowing all beer and malt beverage manufacturers to distribute and sell
their products directly to consumers would not only bring the state into
compliance with Granholm but also promote free enterprise and fairer,
unencumbered access to the market.
191. LBFC Report, supra note 139, at 29.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 35.
194. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 491 (2005).
195. ATF Ruling 2000-1 (2000), http://www.ttb.gov/rulings/2000-1.htm.
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